WT/DS202/R

29 October 2001

United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pine from Korea

   Complaint by Korea

Report of the panel

 

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Mr. Dariusz Rosati (chairperson)

Mr. Roberto Azevedo

Mr. Eduardo Bianchi

 

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$B%;!<%U%,!<%I6(Dj(B($B%;!<%U%,!<%I$K4X$9$k6(Dj(B; Agreement on Safeguards)$B!"#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T!J@i6eI46e==;MG/$N4X@G5Z$SKG0W$K4X$9$k0lHL6(Dj(B; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade$B!K(B

 

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$BHkL)>pJs$N%Q%M%k$X$NDs=P(B(Release of confidential record information to the Panel)

$B%Q%M%k$O!"4Z9q$,Bh#12s%5%V%_%C%7%g%s$^$G$KMW@A$7$?$b$N$N0lIt$b4^$a!"JF9q$KHkL)>pJs$NDs6!$r5a$a$?(B(7.2-7.8)$B!#JF9q$OMW@A$5$l$?HkL)>pJs$N0lIt$rDs=P$7$?(B(7.9)$B!#4Z9q$O!"#22sL\$N%5%V%_%C%7%g%s$K$*$$$F$5$i$J$k>pJsDs6!$r5a$a$?$,!"%Q%M%k$O$=$N$h$&$J>pJsMW@A$OITMW$+$D!?Kt$O(B (and/or)$BE,@Z$G$b$J$$$H$7$F!"4Z9q$N5a$a$rB`$1$?(B(7.10-7.11)$B!#(B

$B#I#T#C$KDs=P$5$l$J$+$C$?$b$7$/$O#S#GA(events)$B$K4X$9$k>Z5r$N5vMF@-(B(The admissibility of evidence not submitted to the ITC, or addressing events after the decision to take a safeguard measure)

$BJF9q$O!"#I#T#C$N%;!<%U%,!<%ID4::;qNA$K4^$^$l$J$$>pJs5Z$S%;!<%U%,!<%IApJs(B(information not on the ITC record, and information concerning events that took after the decision to apply the line pipe measure)$B$O>Z5r$H$7$F5vMF$5$l$J$$$HG'Dj$r9T$&$3$H$r%Q%M%k$K5a$a$F$$$?(B(7.12)$B!#%Q%M%k$O!"Bh(B1$B2s2q9g$K$*$$$F!"5vMF$G$-$J$$(B(inadmissible)$B$H$$$&M}M3$G4Z9q$,Ds=P$7$?>pJs$rGS=|$9$k$3$H$O$7$J$$$,!"$=$N$3$H$O%Q%M%k$,$"$k>pJs$rMQ$$$k$+H]$+!"pJs$,%Q%M%k$N?3::$7$F$$$kLdBj$K4XO"$7$F$$$k$+H]$+$K4X$7$FM=CG$r5v$9$b$N$G$O$J$$!"$H=R$Y$?(B(7.14)$B!#(B

 

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$B!!%Q%M%k$O!"$BA4BN$N(B$B8B3&(B(overall limit on eligibility for the lower tariff)$B$,$J$/$F$O$J$i$J$$$Hl9g(B(country-specific limits)$B$OA4BN$N8B3&$rDj$a$kI,MW$OI,$:$7$b$J$$(B(7.19)$B!"-"-!$N2rr!J#a!K5Z$S#1#3!%#5>r$K$h$C$F$b;Y;}$5$l$k(B(7.20-7.22)$B!"-#4X@G3dEv$NDj5A$K$O!"Dc4X@GN($NE,MQ(an accurate definition must include measures which place a quantitative limit on the application or availability, of a lower tariff rate (and a higher tariff rate applicable once that quantitative limit has been exceeded), irrespective of whether that quantitative limit is (a) $B!H(Boverall$B!I(B, (b) $B!H(Boverall$B!I(B and further allocated among exporting countries, or (c) country-specific, with no $B!H(Boverall$B!I(B limit)(7.23)$B!"-$%i%$%s%Q%$%WA(7.23)$B!#(B

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$B!!%Q%M%k$O!"r$O%i%$%s%Q%$%WAArgentine – Footwear$B>e5i0QJs9p$O!"#S#GAr$,E,MQ$5$l$k$H=R$Y$F$$$k$N$_$G!"B>$N#G#A#T#T5,Dj$NE,MQ$rGS=|$9$k$b$N$G$O$J$$(B(7.31-7.38)$B!"-"(BEC – Bananas III (AB)$B>e5i0QJs9p$K$h$l$P!"#G#A#T#T#1#3>r$NE,MQ=|30$,G'$a$i$l$k$?$a$K$O$=$N;]L@<(E*$K5,Dj$5$l$F$$$kI,MW$,$"$k$,!"#S#G6(Dj$K$O$=$N$h$&$J5,Dj$O$J$$(B(7.40)$B!"-#JF9q$O!"#G#A#T#T#1#3>r$NCf$N8r>D(7.41, 7.44)$B!"-$JF9q$O$^$?!"#G#A#T#T#1#3>r!J#2!K!J#d!K$H#S#G6(Dj#5!%#2>r!J#a!K$O!VF10l(B(identical)$B!W$G$"$k$HrLs2r(principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation)*$B$r:,5r$H$7$?GATT$B#1#3!%#2>r!J#d!K$H#S#G6(Dj#5!%#2>r$H$N4V$K$O=EJ#(B(duplication)$B$O$"$k$+$b$7$l$J$$$,!"#G#A#T#T#1#3>r$,#S#G6(Dj$N5,Dj$rL58z$K$9$k(B(nullify)$B$H$$$&$3$H$O$J$$(B(7.45)$B!"-%#G#A#T#T#1#3>r$H#S#G6(Dj$H$N4V$K>WFM(B(conflict)$B$O$J$$(B(7.48)$B!"-&#G#A#T#T#1#3>r$NE,MQ$rG'$a$J$1$l$P!"4X@G3dEv$N7A$r$H$k#S#GA(7.49)$B!#(B

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$B!!4Z9q$O (representing the total amount of permitted imports)$B!W3dEv$r8GDj$7$F$*$i$:!"#G#A#T#T#1#3!%#2>r!J#a!K$K0cH?$7$?!"$H(7.56)$B!#%Q%M%k$O!"r!J#a!K$K0cH?$9$k$HG'$a$?!#-!#9!$#0#0#0%H%sNc30(B(9,000 ton exception)**$B$OM"F~5v2DNL$NM}O@>e$N@)8B(B(theoretical limit)$B$H$O$J$k$+$b$7$l$J$$$,!"#G#A#T#T#1#3!%#2>r!J#a!K$NMW7o$rK~$?$9$?$a$K$OM}O@>e$N@)8B$G$OIT==J,$G$"$k(B(7.60)$B!"-"JF9q$OK\7o$N$h$&$J%i%$%s%Q%$%WA(7.61)$B!#(B

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*$B>rLs2rrLs$O!"$9$Y$F$N>r9`$K0UL#$H8z2L$r;}$?$;$k$h$&$K2r(the general rule of interpretation which requires that a treaty be interpreted )$B!#$?$H$($P!">rLs$N$"$k5,Dj$O!"F1$8>rLs$NB>$N5,Dj$N8z2L$rL58z$K$7$F$7$^$&$h$&$J2r(one provisions should not be given an interpretation that will result in nullifying the effect of another provision of the same treaty)$B!#(B

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$B!!4Z9q$O!"%i%$%s%Q%$%WArBh#2J85Z$S#5!%#2>r!J#a!K$K0cH?$9$k$H(7.64, 7.66-7.67)$B!"%Q%M%k$Or$N0UL#$K$*$1$k!V?tNL@)8B(B(quantitative restriction)$B!W$G$O$J$/!"$7$?$,$C$F#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>rBh#2J85Z$S#S#G6(Dj#5!%#2>r!J#a!K$OE,MQ$5$l$J$$$H=R$Y$?!#-!#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>r$K$h$l$P!"?tNL@)8B$O!V0lDjDxEY0J2<$KM"F~?tNL$r8:>/$5$;$k(B(reduce the quantity of imports below [a certain] level)$B!WA/$5$;$k$b$N$G$O$J$$(B(7.69)$B!"-"#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>rBh#2J8$r4X@G3dEv$KE,MQ$9$k$3$H$K$O$[$H$s$I0UL#$,$J$$$H9M$($i$l$k(B(7.70-7.71)$B!"-#(BKorea – Dairy Safeguard$B>e5i0Q0w2qJs9p$O!"#S#GA$B$^$?$O(B$B4X@G3dEv$H$$$&8@$$J}$O$7$J$$$O$:$G$"$k(B(7.72)$B!"-$4X@G3dEv$O!"3dEv(B(quota)$B$N0lr!J#a!K$N0UL#$K$*$1$k!V3dEv!W$,4X@G3dEv$r4^$`$H$O9M$($i$l$J$$(B(7.73)$B!#(B

$B!!4Z9q$O$^$?!"(BKorea – Dairy Safeguard$B>e5i0QJs9p!J!V#S#GA$B7hDj$r9T$&:]$K#S#GA$BL@3N$J@5Ev2=$r$7$J$/$F$O$J$i$J$$(B($B!F(Bclear justification$B!G(B has to be given by a Member applying a safeguard measure at the time of the decision, in its recommendations or determinations on the application of the safeguard measure)$B!W!K$r0zMQ$7$D$D!"JF9q$OAZL@$7$F$*$i$:(B(failed to demonstrate the necessity of the line pipe measure at the time of its imposition)$B!"#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>r$K0cH?$7$F$$$k$H(7.76)$B!#(B

$B%Q%M%k$O$^$:!"#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>rBh#1J8$N5AL3$K$D$$$F!"Korea – Dairy Safeguard$B>e5i0QJs9p$K$h$l$P!"#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>r$O#S#GA(7.78-7.79)(obliges a Member applying a safeguard measure to ensure that the measure applied is commensurate with the goals of preventing or remedying serious injury and of facilitating adjustment)$B!"-"$7$+$7!"(BKorea – Dairy Safeguard$B>e5i0QJs9p$K$h$l$P!"JF9q$OAZL@$9$k$3$H$r5AL3IU$1$i$l$F$$$J$$(B(7.81)(the United States was not required to demonstrate, at the time of imposition, that the line pipe measure was $B!H(Bnecessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment$B!I(B)$B!#(B

$B!!%Q%M%k$O!"ZL@$7$F$$$J$$$H7kO@$7$?!#-!4Z9q$O!"%i%$%s%Q%$%WA(International Trade Commission)$B$K$h$C$F4+9p$5$l$?A(on a comparison of the line pipe measure with the measure recommended by the ITC and the measure proposed by Petitioners)$B!"%i%$%s%Q%$%WAe$G$"$C$?$HrBh#1J8$N0UL#$K$*$1$k!VI,MW!W$+$b$7$/$O$=$l0J>e$N$b$N$G$"$C$?>l9g$N$_$G$"$k(B(7.93)(the comparison proposed by Korea would only be determinative if the restrictive effect of either the ITC recommendation or the Petitioners$B!G(B proposal was set at, or above, the maximum amount $B!H(Bnecessary$B!I(B within the meaning of Article 5.1, first sentence)$B!"-"#I#T#C$N4+9p$7$?Ae!K(B(at (or above))$B$G$"$C$?$3$H$O>ZL@$5$l$F$*$i$:!"!VI,MW!W$JA$B0J2<(B(below)$B$G$"$C$?$+$b$7$l$:!"$=$N0UL#$G!"#I#T#C$N4+9p$7$?Al9g$b$"$j$&$k(B(7.94)$B!"-##I#T#C$O!"?=@A(would exceed the amount necessary to prevent ore remedy serious injury)$B!W$H$7$F$*$j!"$3$l$,@5$7$1$l$P?=@AZ$9$k:]$NE,@Z$J%Y%s%A%^!<%/$H$J$j$&$k$,(B(it is possible that the Petitioners$B!G(B proposal could constitute an appropriate benchmark for the purpose of assessing the line pipe measure.  That is to say, if the line pipe measure were shown to be more restrictive of imports than the Petitioners$B!G(B proposal, one could perhaps infer from this that the line pipe measure also exceeded what was $B!H(Bnecessary$B!I(B for the purpose of Article 5.1, first sentence)$B!"4Z9q$O%i%$%s%Q%$%WA(7.95-7.97)(in order to demonstrate that the line pipe measure was more restrictive of imports than the measure proposed by Petitioners, Korea should have compared the application of the measures as a whole.  Korea should not have compared the application of the separate constituent parts of the measures in isolation.  Nor should Korea have ignored certain important qualitative differences between the two measures)$B!"-$4Z9q$N0zMQ$7$F$$$k!V0U?^$5$l$?8z2L$K$D$$$F$N?dDj>Z5r(B(inferential evidence of the intended impact)$B!W!J3dEvFbM"F~(B(in-quota imports)$B!"3dEv30M"F~(B(out-of-quota imports)$B!"M"F~%G!<%?!"7P:QJ,@O!"M"F~0J30$NMW0x$K$h$kB;32!K$O!"I,$:$7$b%i%$%s%Q%$%WAe$NAZL@$9$k$b$N$G$O$J$/!"$^$?(BKorea – Dairy Safeguard$B>e5i0QJ,@O$+$iL@$i$+$J$h$&$KJF9q$OAZL@$7$J$/$H$bNI$$(B(7.98-7.110)$B!#(B

$B!!4Z9q$O$^$?!"#I#T#C$NB;32G'Dj;~$K$O;:6H$N7J5$$O2sI|798~$K$"$j!"5_:QA$K$"$C$?$H$7$F$b#3G/4V$N5_:QA(no remedy, let alone a measure for three years, was necessary)$B!"$7$?$,$C$FJF9q$O#S#G6(Dj#7!%#1>r$K0cH?$7$F$$$k$H(7.112)$B!#(B

$B!!%Q%M%k$O!"4Z9q$N#S#G6(Dj#7!%#1>r$Nr$K78$k(7.114)$B!#(B

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$B!!4Z9q$O!"JF9q$OArBh#1J8$NMW7o$rK~$?$7$F$$$k$3$H$r>ZL@$7$F$*$i$:!"$7$?$,$C$F#S#G6(Dj#3!%#1>r5Z$S#4!%#2>r!J#c!K$K0cH?$7$?$H(7.116)$B!#(B

$B!!%Q%M%k$O!"r5Z$S#4!%#2>r!J#c!K$K78$k?=N)$O%Q%M%k$NIUBw;v9`(B(terms of reference)$B$K4^$^$l$J$$$H7kO@$7$?!#-!#S#G6(Dj#5!%#1>r$N?=N)$OI,A3E*$K#S#G6(Dj#4!%#2>r!J#c!K$N?=N)$rH<$&$o$1$G$O$J$/(B(there is nothing in the text of either provision to suggest that a claim under one necessarily implies a claim under the other)$B!"#S#G6(Dj#5>r$K78$k?=N)$H#S#G6(Dj#3!%#1>r5Z$S#4!%#2>r!J#c!K$K78$k?=N)$H$O!"4Z9q$N(integrally linked)$B!W?=N)$H$OG'$a$i$l$J$$(B(7.120-122)$B!"-"4Z9q$N%Q%M%k@_CVMW@A$N$J$+$K$OJF9q$N>pJs$NDs6!$r#S#G6(Dj#3>r5Z$S#4>r0cH?$H$7$?0l@a$,$"$k$,!"#S#G6(Dj#3!%#1>r5Z$S#4!%#2>r!J#c!K$OC1$J$k>pJsDs6!0J>e$N$b$N$rMW5a$7$F$*$j!"$=$N$h$&$J>\:Y$JMW7o$,4Z9q$N%Q%M%k@_CVMW@A$NCf$K4^$^$l$F$$$?$H$O9M$($i$l$J$$(B(Since Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) calls for far more than the simple provision of information, no reasonable reading of Claim 9 could encompass the more detailed requirements of these provisions)(7.123)$B!"-#4Z9q$OJF9q$,$3$l$i$N?=N)$K4X$7$F2?$NITMx1W$bHo$C$F$$$J$$(B(the United States had not suffered any prejudice)$B$H(there is no question of whether or not the legal basis of that claim, or the claim itself, was set forth with sufficient clarity in the Request for Establishment)$B>l9g$K$O!"ITMx1W(B(prejudice)$B$rF@$?$+H]$+$H$$$&LdBj$O@8$8$J$$(B(7.124)$B!#(B

 

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$B!!4Z9q$O!"JF9q$,%i%$%s%Q%$%WA]$+$i%+%J%@5Z$S%a%-%7%3$r=|30$7$?$3$H$O!"#G#A#T#T#1!"#1#3!"#1#9>r5Z$S#S#G6(Dj#2!%#2>r$N:G7C9qBT6x86B'$K0cH?$7$F$$$k$H(7.127-7.130)$B!#0lJ}JF9q$O!"%+%J%@5Z$S%a%-%7%3$N=|30$O<+M3KG0WCO0h$K4X$9$k#G#A#T#T#2#4>r$K$h$jG'$a$i$l$F$$$k$HH?O@$7$?(B(7.131-7.134)$B!#(B

$B!!%Q%M%k$Or$K78$k?=N)$KBP$7!"JF9q$O#G#A#T#T#2#4>r$r93J[$H$7$FMQ$$$k$3$H$,$G$-$k!"$H7kO@$7$?!#-!#G#A#T#T#2#4!%#5>r$K$h$l$P!"2CLA9q$O!"$"$k5,Dj$5$l$?>u67$K$*$$$F!"!V4X@G$=$NB>$N@)8BE*DL>&5,B'!JBh==0l>r!"Bh==Fs>r!"Bh==;0>r!"Bh==;M>r!"Bh==8^>r$*$h$SBhFs==>r$N5,Dj$K4p$E$$$FG'$a$i$l$k$b$N$GI,MW$H$5$l$k$b$N$r=|$/!#!K$,$=$N9=@.CO0h$N86;:$N;:IJ$N9=@.CO0h4V$K$*$1$ke$9$Y$F$NKG0W$K$D$$$F!WGQ;_$9$k$3$H$rG'$a$i$l$F$$$k(B(We understand Article XXIV:5 to mean that Members are authorized, under certain prescribed circumstances, to eliminate $B!H(Bduties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) $B!D(B on substantially all the trade$B!I(B between them and their free-trade area partners)(7.140)$B!"-"%i%$%s%Q%$%WA$N@)8BE*DL>&5,B'!W$G$"$k$H9M$($i$l$k$+$i!"#2$D$N>r7o!J#N#A#F#T#A$,(B(1)$B#G#A#T#T#2#4!%#5>r!J#b!K5Z$S!J#c!K$r=e(2)$B4X@G$=$NB>$N@)8BE*DL>&5,B'$r!Ve$9$Y$F$N!W#N#A#F#T#A0hFbKG0W$K$D$$$FGQ;_$7$F$$$k$3$H(B(NAFTA must (1) comply with Article XXIV:5(b) and (c), and (2) eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations if commerce on $B!H(Bsubstantially all$B!I(B intra-NAFTA trade$B!K$rK~$?$98B$j%+%J%@5Z$S%a%-%7%3$N=|30$O#G#A#T#T#2#4!%#5>r$K$h$jG'$a$i$l$k(B(7.141)$B!"-##N#A#F#T#A$O>e5-#2$D$N>r7o$rK~$?$7$F$*$j!"$7$?$,$C$FJF9q$O!"4Z9q$N#G#A#T#T#1!"#1#3!"#1#9>r$K4X$9$k?=N)$KBP$7!"#G#A#T#T#2#4>r$r93J[$H$7$FMQ$$$k$3$H$,$G$-$k(B(the United States is entitled to rely on an Article XXIV defence against Korea$B!G(Bs claim under Articles I, XIII and XIX regarding the exclusion of imports from Canada and Mexico from the scope of the line pipe measure)$B!"-$(BTurkey – Textiles$B>e5i0QJs9p$G$O!">e5-$N>r7o$K2C$(!"I,MW@-%F%9%H!JEv;v9q$O!"LdBj$H$J$C$F$$$kAZL@$7$J$/$F$O$J$i$J$$$H$$$&%F%9%H!K(B(necessity test ($B!H(B[a] party must demonstrate that the formation of a customs union would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue$B!I(B))$B$7$F$$$k$,!"$3$l$O<+M3KG0WCO0h$N7A@.$K:]$7(B$BBh;09q$+$i$NM"F~$KBP$7$F(B$B@)8BE*A(the imposition by a member of a customs union of restrictive measures against imports from a third country, upon the formation of that customs union)$B$H$$$&Ev3:;v7o$N;v(B$B>p$K$h$k$b$N$H9M$($i$l!"K\7o$K$*$$$F$OI,MW@-%F%9%H$NE,MQ$O$J$$(B(7.147-7.148)$B!"(B