WT/DS246/AB/R

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George Abi-Saab (Presiding Member)

Luiz Olavo Baptista

Giorgio Sacerdoti

$B#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T!J#1#9#9#4G/$N4X@G5Z$SKG0W$K4X$9$k0lHL6(Dj(B; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994$B!K!"r9`!J0[$J$k$+$D0lAXM-Mx$JBT6xJB$S$KAj8_e9q$N$h$j==J,$J;22C$K$D$$$F$N7hDj!"(BDecision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries$B!K(B

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$B!!#E#C$O!"-!r9`$O#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$N!VNc30(B(exception)$B!W$GKcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$r@5Ev2=$9$k$?$a$N!V@Q6KE*93J[(B(affirmative defence)$B!W$G$"$k$H$7$?%Q%M%kG'Dj$O8m$j$G$"$C$?!"-"r9`$H#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$OF1%l%Y%k$K$"$jr9`$O#1!%#1>r$NE,MQ$rGS=|$9$k$?$a(B(the Enabling Clause exist $B!H(Bside-by-side and on an equal level$B!I(B with Article I:1, and applies to the exclusion thereof, rather than as an exception thereto)$B!"%$%s%I$,r9`$K4p$E$/?=N)$r9T$C$F$$$J$$$3$H$rF'$^$($F>e5i0Q0w2q$OKcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$Hr9`$H$N@09g@-$r8!F$$9$Y$-$G$O$J$$!"$H(85)$B!#(B

$B!!>e5i0Q0w2q$Or9`$,#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$NE,MQ$rGS=|$;$:!"$`$7$mF1#1!%#1>r$NNc30>r9`$G$"$k$H$N%Q%M%kG'Dj$r;Y;}$7$?!#-!(BUS – Wool Shirts and Blouses$B>e5i0QJs9p$K$h$l$P!"K\7o$K$*$1$kN)>Z@UG$$NG[J,$r7h$a$k$?$a$K$O!"%$%s%I$,KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$Nr9`Hs@09g@-$K$D$$$F$N!V?=N)!W$r9T$o$J$1$l$P$J$i$J$$$N$+!"$"$k$$$O#E#C$,KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$Nr9`@09g@-$r!V93J[!W$H$7$F1gMQ$7$J$1$l$P$J$i$J$$$N$+(B(whether India must raise a $B!H(Bclaim$B!I(B and prove that the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with the Enabling Clause, or whether the European Communities must raise and prove, in $B!H(Bdefence$B!I(B that the Drug Arrangements are consistent with the Enabling Clause, in order to justify the alleged inconsistency of the Drug Arrangements with Article I:1)$B$rH=CG$9$kI,MW$,$"$k(B(87)$B!"-"2a5n$N>e5i0Q0w2qJs9p$K$h$l$P!"$"$k>r9`$,!"K\Mh$J$i$PJL$N>r9`$N0cH?$H$J$kAu67$K$*$$$F5vMF$9$k$h$&$J>l9g$G!"$+$D$3$N#2$D$N>r9`$N$$$:$l$+$,B>J}$N>r9`$K8@5Z$7$F$$$k>l9g$K$O!"A0r9`$,8er9`$NE,MQGS=|$r<(:6$7$F$$$k>l9g$K8B$j!"?=N)9q$,A0r9`$K$D$$$FN)>Z@UG$$rIi$$(B(In cases where one provision permits, in certain circumstances, behaviour that would otherwise be inconsistent with an obligation in another provision, and one of the two provisions refers to the other provision, the Appellate Body has found that the complaining party bears the burden of establishing that a challenged measure is inconsistent with the provision permitting particular behaviour only where one of the provisions suggests that the obligation is not applicable to the said measure)$B!"$=$l0J30$N>l9g$K$OA0r9`$ONc30$"$k$$$O93J[$H$7$FHo?=N)9q$,N)>Z@UG$$rIi$&(B(88)$B!"-##1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r5Z$Sr9`$NJ88@$NDL>o$N0UL#$+$i!"r9`%Q%i#1$OES>e9q$K0[$J$k$+$D0lAXM-Mx$JBT6x$rM?$($k$?$a$K#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$N5AL3$NLH=|$rG'$a$?(B(Paragraph 1 thus excepts Members from complying with the obligation contained in Article I:1 for the purpose of providing differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, provided that such treatment is in accordance with the conditions set out in the Enabling Clause)$BNc30>r9`$@$H2r$5$l$k(B(89-90)$B!"-$r9`$O!"@h?J9q$,ES>e9q$N!V7P:Q3+H/(B(economic development)$B!W$rB%$9$?$a$K:N$k$Y$-!V@Q6KE*$JEXNO(B(positive efforts)$B!W$H$7$F!"#W#T#O6(Dj$Nr9`$rNc30$H$_$J$7$F$b$3$NL\E*$NC#@.$,K8$2$i$l$kLu$G$O$J$$(B(91-94)$B!"-$4D6-J]8n$b#W#T#O6(Dj$NL\E*$N$R$H$D$H$$$($k$,!"4D6-J]8n$K$D$$$F$b#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#2#0>r(B(g)$B$K$h$jNc30$H$7$F5,Dj$5$l$F$$$k(B(95-97)$B!"-%0J>e$rF'$^$(!"r9`$,#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$N!VNc30!W$G$"$k$H$$$&%Q%M%kG'Dj$r;Y;}$9$k(B(98-99)$B!"-&$5$i$K!"$"$kAr0cH?$HG'Dj$5$l$F=i$a$F$=$NAr9`$G@5Ev2=$5$l$&$k$+H]$+$,LdBj$H$J$k$N$G$"$j!"r9`$O#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$NE,MQ$rGS=|$9$k$o$1$G$O$J$$(B(100-103)$B!#(B

$B!!>e5i0Q0w2q$O!"0J2<$N$h$&$JM}M3$GN)>Z@UG$$K4X$9$k%Q%M%kG'Dj$r0lIt=$@5$7!"(B(i)$BK\7o$K$*$$$F$O$^$:%$%s%I$,KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$N0cK!@-$rr9`$NLdBj$rDs5/$9$kI,MW$,$"$k$,!"KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$,r9`$K$h$C$F@5Ev2=$5$l$k$3$H$K$D$$$F$O#E#C$,N)>Z@UG$$rIi$&(B(it was incumbent upon India to raise the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994, but that the European Communities bore the burden of proving that the Drug Arrangements satisfy the conditions of the Enabling Clause, in order to justify those Arrangements under that Clause)$B!"(B(ii)$BK\7o$K$*$$$F%$%s%I$Or9`%Q%i#2(B(a)$B$NLdBj$rDs5/$7$F$$$k$H$$$($k(B(India sufficiently raised paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause in making its claim of inconsistency with Article I:1 before the Panel)$B!"$H=R$Y$?!#-!(BUS – Wool Shirts and Blouses$B>e5i0QJs9p$G=R$Y$?$h$&$K!"!VNc30!W$K$D$$$F$NN)>Z@UG$$ODL>oHo?=N)9q$,Ii$$!"$7$?$,$C$FK\7o$K$*$$$F$O#E#C$,r9`$K$h$C$FKcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$,@5Ev2=$5$l$k$3$H$K$D$$$F$NN)>Z@UG$$rIi$&$,!"(Bjura novit curia$B!J:[H==j$OK!$rCN$k!K$N86B'$K$h$l$P!"#E#C$Or9`$NFCDj$N5,Dj$K$D$$$F$NK!E*2rZ5r$r<($;$P$h$$(B(it is not the responsibility of the European Communities to provide us with the legal interpretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling Clause; instead, the burden of the European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the Enabling Clause)(104-105)$B!"-"r9`$K4p$E$/93J[$r(B$BDs5/$9$k(B$BK!E*@UG$(B(legal responsibility for raising a defence)$B$K$D$$$F$O!"r9`$N#W#T#OBN@)$K$*$1$kLr3d$N=EMW@-$d$=$NFbMF!"#1#9#7#1G/$N%&%'%$%P!<7hDj$+$i8=:_$^$G$NNr;KE*7P0^$+$i?d;!$5$l$kr9`$NFCJL$J0LCV$E$1!"$^$?r9`$K4p$E$/Ar$N0cH?$H$J$k$,r9`$NMW7o$rK~$?$9>l9g$K$O#1>r$N5AL3$rLH=|$5$l$k$H$$$&;v>p$K4U$_!"r9`$K4p$E$-:N$i$l$?Ar0cH?$r(legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly)$B!W$r<($7$?$H$O$$$($J$$(B(106-110)$B!"-#r9`$K$O#1#9#9#4G/$N#G#A#T#T#1!%#1>r$+$i$N0oC&$,G'$a$i$l$k$?$a$N$5$^$6$^$JMW7o$,5,Dj$5$l$F$*$j!"$3$N$h$&$J5,Dj$O!V?=N)$NK!E*:,5r!W$^$?J6Ah$N!VLdBj!W$r9=@.$9$k$b$N$H$$$(!"?=N)9q$O?.5AB'$K=>$$%Q%M%k@_CVMW@A$NCf$GLdBj$H$9$kr9`$N>r9`$rFCDj$7!"(111-113)$B!"-$2CLA9q$Or9`$K4p$E$-#1>r$N5AL3$r0oC&$7ES>e9q$K!V0[$J$k$+$D0lAXM-Mx$JBT6x!W$rM?$($k$3$H$r(B$B>)Ne$5$l$F$$$k(B(encouraged)$B$H$$$&$3$H$+$i$b!"(B$BHo?=N)9q(B$B$,$I$N$h$&$JMWAG$K4p$E$-93J[$7$J$1$l$P$J$i$J$$$N$+!"(B$B?=N)9q(B$B$,E&<($7$J$1$l$P$J$i$J$$(B(a complaining party has to define the parameters within which the responding party must make that defence)(111, 114)$B!"-%$^$?!"#E#C$,KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$rr9`$K$h$C$F@5Ev2=$7$h$&$H$9$k$3$H$O?=N)9q$N%$%s%I$K$b==J,M=B,$7$($?$3$H$G$"$j(B(would have been well aware)$B!"%$%s%I$O!VEv3:J6Ah$r2r7h$9$k$?$a$K@?(engage in [dispute settlement] procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute)$B!W$?$a?=N)9q$H$7$Fr9`$NFCDj$N>r9`$K4X$9$k?=N)$rE83+$9$kI,MW(B$B$,$"$k(B(India, as the complaining party, should reasonably have articulated its claims of inconsistency with specific provisions of the Enabling Clause) (115-117)$B!"-&$7$+$70J>e$O!"%$%s%I$,r9`$K$D$$$FN)>Z@UG$$rIi$&$H$$$&$3$H$G$O$J$/!"r9`$K$h$C$FAZ@UG$$O#E#C$,Ii$$!"%$%s%I$N@UG$$O$"$/$^$Gr9`$N>r9`$rFCDj$9$k5AL3$K$H$I$^$k(B(115, 118)$B!"-'K\7o$K$*$$$F%$%s%I$O!"6(5DMW@A$H%Q%M%k@_CVMW@A$NCf$Gr9`%Q%i#2(B(a)$B!"#3(B(a)$B!"#3(B(c)$B$K8@5Z$7!"$^$?%Q%M%k$X$NDs=P=qLL$NCf$G!"KcLt4XO"FCJL@)EY$,r9`%Q%i#2(B(a)$B$NMW7o$rK~$?$7$F$$$J$$$H$$$&@bL@$r9T$C$F$*$j!">e=R$7$?r9`$NLdBj$rDs5/$9$k@UG$$r2L$?$7$F$$$k$H$$$($k(B(119-122)$B!#(B

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